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STAMP DUTY ISSUES IN SINGAPORE 
CORPORATE PRACTICE 
A new dimension to the determination and computation of 
stamp duties payable in corporate transactions has been 
introduced due to the additional conveyance duties (“ACD”) 
regime. For companies with significant residential property 
holdings, liability to pay ACD potentially extends to all 
transactions involving the issuance, transfer or cancellation 
of equity interests. This article considers the impact of ACD 
on several common corporate transactions in Singapore, 
addressing the risks practitioners may face in being 
blindsided by potential tax liabilities. Besides highlighting 
potential pitfalls, this article explores the use of advance 
rulings and preferring debt financing over equity financing 
for tax optimisation. 
Vincent OOI* 
BA (Oxon); 
Lecturer of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University; 
Research Fellow, Centre for Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia. 
I. Introduction
1 The determination and computation of stamp duties in the
context of corporate practice has traditionally never been too
complicated. If real properties are involved, one simply pays the
necessary buyer’s stamp duty (“BSD”),1 additional buyer’s stamp duty
(“ABSD”)2 and/or seller’s stamp duty (“SSD”),3 taking care to note the
* I am grateful to Liu Hern Kuan, Stephen Phua, Leung Yew Kwong, Esther Wong
and Yap Jia Jun for their insightful comments.
1 Stamp duties are taxes levied on instruments prescribed in the First Schedule to the 
Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) (“SDA”). Under Art 3(a)(ii) of the First 
Schedule to the SDA, buyer’s stamp duty (“BSD”) for non-residential property is 
levied as follows: the first $180,000 of the value of the property is taxed at 1%, the 
next $180,000 at 2% and the rest at 3%. As of 20 February 2018, BSD for residential 
property is levied as follows: the first $180,000 of the value of the property is taxed 
at 1%, the next $180,000 at 2%, the next $640,000 at 3% and the rest at 4%. 
2 See Art 3(bf) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed): 
additional buyer’s stamp duty is only levied on residential properties. Depending 
on the status of the buyer (eg, Singaporean, permanent resident, foreigner or 
entity) and the number of Singapore residential properties held at the time of 
purchase, it can range from 0% to a maximum of 15%. 
3 See Art 3(bg)(b) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed). Seller’s stamp duty is levied on both residential and industrial 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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differences between residential, industrial and mixed-use properties. If 
there is a need to transfer shares, one pays the 0.2% stamp duty on the 
transfer of shares,4 unless the company in question is listed, in which 
case no stamp duty needs to be paid at all. Where applicable, one applies 
for the relevant stamp duty reliefs on the reconstruction or 
amalgamation of companies,5 or on the transfer of assets between 
associated entities.6 Finally, one has to remember to pay the duty on the 
odd mortgage in the deal (capped at $500).7 Regardless of whether the 
corporate transaction involved mergers, acquisitions, initial public 
offerings, secondary offerings, equity financing, or debt financing, the 
range of relevant stamp duties applicable rarely extended beyond those 
mentioned above. Rather, in a significant number of corporate 
transactions, stamp duty issues would often not even arise. 
2 This happy position has been significantly altered by the 
introduction of additional conveyance duties (“ACD”) on 10 March 
2017.8 Under the new ACD regime, where a significant proportion of an 
entity’s9 assets are residential properties, the entity is classified as a 
“property-holding entity” or “PHE”10 and additional duties are payable 
where there is a conveyance of an equity interest in the entity. This 
means that a multitude of corporate transactions involving such entities 
                                                                                                                               
properties. Depending on the length of time for which a property is held before it is 
sold, it ranges from 0% to 12% for residential properties and 0% to 15% for 
industrial properties. For the definitions of “residential”, “industrial” and “mixed-
use” properties, see Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – 
Stamp Duty: Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) on Purchase of Residential 
Properties Revised Edition (11 January 2013) at p 6. 
4 See Art 3(c) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
5 See s 15(1)(a) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) and Stamp Duties 
(Relief from Stamp Duty upon Reconstruction or Amalgamation of Companies) 
Rules (Cap 312, Rg 3, 2002 Rev Ed). 
6 See s 15(1)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) and Stamp Duties 
(Relief from Stamp Duty upon Transfer of Assets between Associated Permitted 
Entities) Rules 2014 (S 28/2014). 
7 See Art 9 of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
8 This article assumes that readers have a basic familiarity with the additional 
conveyance duties (“ACD”) regime and does not go beyond a very brief 
introduction. For a detailed breakdown of the ACD regime, see Vincent Ooi, “The 
New Additional Conveyance Duties Regime in the Stamp Duties Act” (2018) 
30 SAcLJ 119. 
9 “Entities” subject to the additional conveyance duties regime are companies, 
partnerships and property trusts. “Partnerships” include general partnerships, 
limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships. See s 23(21) of the Stamp 
Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
10 “Property-holding entity” (or “PHE”) is defined in ss 23(13)(a) and 23(13)(b) of 
the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). At least 50% of the market value of 
an entity must be made up of residential properties (held directly or indirectly) 
before an entity may be classified as a PHE under the additional conveyance duties 
regime. 
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may now be potentially dutiable. A straightforward sale of shares in a 
PHE would now attract not only the 0.2% stamp duty payable on the 
transfer of shares, but also ACD that could reach a maximum of 
approximately 31% of the value of the residential property indirectly 
transferred.11 
3 Furthermore, the ACD regime includes a very strong set of anti-
avoidance rules that may affect a whole range of corporate transactions. 
Essentially, the Commissioner of Stamp Duties (“Commissioner”) has 
the power to levy ACD on any transaction that results in an increase in 
equity interests owned by one person, and a decrease in equity interests 
owned by another.12 This could potentially catch any corporate 
transaction involving the issuance, transfer or cancellation of equity 
interests. This article seeks to examine the potential far-reaching 
implications of the ACD regime and consider how ACD may apply to 
each of the types of common corporate transactions carried out in 
Singapore. 
A. Preliminary observations 
4 There are a few preliminary observations which follow from a 
cursory look at the ACD regime. First, the ACD regime is both narrow 
and vast in scope at the same time. It is narrow in the sense that it only 
applies to transfers of equity interests in PHEs, which do not make up a 
very significant proportion of companies in Singapore. However, for 
those companies which are caught by the ACD regime, practically every 
corporate transaction relating to the issuance, transfer or cancellation of 
equity interests can potentially fall under the ACD regime. Second, ACD 
is an unusual tax in that it can be levied on a “non-party” to the 
corporate transaction. For instance, in a private placement, shares are 
issued to a new investor and the transaction is technically only between 
the issuing company and the investor. However, under the ACD regime, 
a majority shareholder holding 50% or more of the equity interests in 
the issuing company could potentially be liable to pay ACD, 
notwithstanding that he was technically a “non-party” to the 
transaction. Finally, ACD is particularly relevant where there are 
concentrated shareholdings. Where a company has no shareholder 
holding onto 50% or more of the equity interests,13 it is very unlikely 
                                                          
11 This is up to a maximum of approximately 19% payable by the transferee: see 
Arts 3A(1)(a), 3A(1)(b), 3A(1)(c), 3A(1)(d), 3A(2)(c) and 3A(2)(d) of the First 
Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) (“SDA”); and up to a 
maximum of 12% payable by the transferor: see Arts 3A(1)(e), 3A(1)(f), 3A(2)(e) 
and 3A(2)(f) of the First Schedule to the SDA. 
12 See s 23C of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
13 The 50% figure is prescribed by s 23(11) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed) (“SDA”), referring to paras 4(1) and 4(2) of the Stamp Duties 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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that ACD will have to be paid. On the other hand, if there is one such 
majority shareholder, he is likely to be liable to pay ACD on almost all 
transactions involving any issuance, transfer or cancellation of equity 
interests. 
(1) Mergers and acquisitions – Asset sale or share sale 
5 A target company may be acquired in two ways: (a) shares 
acquisition; or (b) assets acquisition. In shares acquisition scenarios, the 
main stamp duties payable are those on the transfer of shares, while for 
assets acquisition, BSD, ABSD and SSD may apply. Under the previous 
law, where a company holds a significant amount of property (especially 
residential property), it was generally considered to be more tax-
efficient to effect a shares acquisition than an assets acquisition, given 
the considerable disparity in the stamp duty rates (0.2% versus 
potentially approximately 3% or, as of 20 February 2018, for residential 
property, 4%). The advent of ACD changes the calculus. Firstly, where 
the target company is a PHE, any tax advantage gained from effecting a 
share sale rather than an asset sale vanishes. Rather, the taxpayer is stuck 
with paying 0.2% on transfer of shares in addition to what he would 
have been liable to pay on the transfer of assets anyway. 
6 Secondly, as noted above,14 stamp duty reliefs are available in 
certain circumstances on the reconstruction or amalgamation of 
companies, or on the transfer of assets between associated entities, 
subject to conditions. Such stamp duty reliefs extend to both the transfer 
of shares and the direct transfers of property. Thus, if all the necessary 
conditions are met, the net stamp duty paid for an acquisition may in 
fact be $0, regardless of whether an asset or share acquisition is used. 
Currently, if an asset acquisition is used, the traditional stamp duty relief 
provisions should still apply, potentially reducing the duty payable. 
However, in a share acquisition, the stamp duty relief provisions are not 
applicable to the ACD payable.15 Indeed, the Stamp Duties Act16 (“SDA”) 
actually provides that the relief “does not apply to an instrument that is 
executed for the purpose of or in connection with the transfer, 
conveyance or assignment of any equity interest in an entity that is 
chargeable with any duty under section 23”. In other words, not only do 
the reliefs not apply to the ACD payable, they also do not apply to the 
                                                                                                                               
(Section 23) Order 2017 (“section 23 Order”) is a piece of subsidiary legislation 
provided for by s 23D of the SDA. It allows quick variation of certain crucial values 
in the additional conveyance duties regime. Currently, the values prescribed under 
paras 4(1) and 4(2) of the section 23 Order are both “50% or more”. This may be 
subject to change. 
14 See para 1, at nn 5 and 6 above. 
15 See ss 15(1A) and 15A(1AA) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
16 Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed. 
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0.2% stamp duty for the transfer of shares. Thus, merger and acquisition 
or restructuring takes place, and one is confident that one can meet the 
conditions to qualify for relevant stamp duty reliefs; it is 
overwhelmingly more tax-efficient to use an assets acquisition rather 
than a shares acquisition procedure. 
(2) Corporate finance – Debt versus equity financing 
7 ACD is levied on conveyances of equity interests in PHEs. 
While this article will go on to consider precisely what “equity interests” 
mean in practice, it is likely that ACD will largely only apply to equity 
financing and not debt financing.17 Commercially, there is a cost to 
financing: lenders putting up debt capital will need to be paid interest, 
while shareholders putting up equity capital will need to be paid 
dividends. However, it is clear that as a matter of Singapore law, while 
interest may be a tax-deductible expense, dividend payouts are strictly 
not tax-deductible,18 making equity financing potentially more 
expensive, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, even before the introduction of 
the ACD regime, it was generally considered to be more tax-efficient to 
raise money through debt rather than equity financing. The 
introduction of ACD further tilts the equation in favour of debt 
financing, which may be an unintended distortion created by a statute 
that arguably was never intended to influence corporate financing 
decisions in the first place. 
B. Basic overview of additional conveyance duties regime 
8 ACD is the collective term for four kinds of stamp duties: 
duties A, B, C and D.19 Duties A and C are analogous to BSD and ABSD, 
but levied on indirect transfers of residential property. Similarly, 
duties B and D are analogous to SSD. To determine the applicability of 
ACD, the SDA prescribes three common conditions which must be 
satisfied for all four kinds of duties: (a) there must be a conveyance of 
equity interests in an entity;20 (b) the entity must be a PHE at the time of 
the conveyance;21 and (c) the person potentially liable to pay the ACD 
                                                          
17 It is possible to argue that additional conveyance duties may in fact apply to certain 
categories of debt financing such as preference shares. This is addressed in detail in 
para 28, at n 45 below. 
18 See BML v Comptroller of Income Tax [2017] SGHC 118 and Inland Revenue 
Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Income Tax Treatment of Hybrid 
Instruments (19 May 2014) at para 2.1. 
19 The relevant charging subsections are ss 23(2), 23(3), 23(5) and 23(6) of the Stamp 
Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) respectively. 
20 See s 23(1) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
21 See ss 23(2), 23(3), 23(5) and 23(6) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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must be a significant owner of the entity.22 In relation to “equity 
interests”, s 23(21)(a) of the SDA”) defines them as follows: “where the 
entity is a company, an issued share in the company that is not a treasury 
share”. As for the concept of a significant owner, it refers to a person who 
beneficially owns 50% or more of the equity interests in the PHE.23 The 
SDA also provides for conditions that are unique to each of the four 
kinds of duties. 
(1) Duty A – Grantee has no other related interests 
9 The grantee is liable to pay duty A if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE either immediately before or after the execution of the 
conveyance.24 
(2) Duty B – Grantor has no other related interests 
10 The grantor is liable to pay duty B if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE and the conveyance takes place within three years of his 
acquisition of his interest in the PHE.25 However, where a grantor 
disposes of all his interests in the PHE and then subsequently becomes a 
significant owner of the PHE again, any conveyance executed in the 
interim will not be subject to duty B.26 
(3) Duty C – Grantee has other related interests 
11 The grantee is liable to pay duty C if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE either immediately before or after the execution of the 
conveyance.27 The difference from duty A is that in the determination of 
whether the target entity is a PHE, the other holdings of the grantee are 
taken into account. If the target entity would be a PHE if it and the other 
entities which the grantee has a significant stake in were a single entity, 
then the target entity is deemed to be a PHE. 
(4) Duty D – Grantor has other related interests 
12 The grantor is liable to pay duty D if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE and the conveyance takes place within three years of his 
                                                          
22 See ss 23(2), 23(3), 23(5) and 23(6) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
23 As noted in para 4, at n 13 above, the 50% figure is prescribed by s 23(11) of the 
Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), referring to paras 4(1) and 4(2) of the 
Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. Currently, the values prescribed under 
paras 4(1) and 4(2) are both “50% or more”. This may be subject to change. 
24 See s 23(2) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
25 See s 23(3) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
26 See s 23(4) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
27 See s 23(5) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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acquisition of his interest in the PHE.28 However, where a grantor 
disposes of all his interests in the PHE and then subsequently becomes a 
significant owner of the PHE again, any conveyance executed in the 
interim will not be subject to duty D.29 The difference from duty B is 
that in the determination of whether the target entity is a PHE, the other 
holdings of the grantor are taken into account. If the target entity would 
be a PHE if it and the other entities which the grantor has a significant 
stake in were a single entity, then the target entity is deemed to be 
a PHE. 
(5) Multiple heads of additional conveyance duties on same 
instrument 
13 The SDA makes it clear that both duties A and B, or both 
duties C and D, depending on the situation, may be charged on the same 
instrument and may be charged in addition to the stamp duty on 
conveyance of shares.30 This mirrors the BSD, ABSD and SSD position, 
since duties A and C are levied on the buyer and duties B and D are 
levied on the seller. 
(6) Quantum 
14 For duties A and C, the ACD payable is the BSD and ABSD rate 
levied on the value of the change in beneficial ownership of all PIPs 
indirectly owned by the PHE (apportioned by percentage of ownership). 
For duties B and D, the ACD payable is the SSD rate levied on the value 
of the change in beneficial ownership of all prescribed immovable 
properties (“PIPs”) indirectly owned by the PHE (apportioned by 
percentage of ownership). 
C. Catching artificially-split transactions 
15 A taxpayer may attempt to reduce ACD liability by artificially 
splitting a transaction. For example, an individual seeking to purchase 
100% of a PHE may do so in a single transaction and pay ACD based on 
100% of the equity interests acquired. He may instead choose to 
purchase 49.9% of the PHE first, paying no ACD on the transaction 
(since he is not a significant owner at that point), and then subsequently 
purchasing the remaining 50.1%. The taxpayer may think that under 
this arrangement, ACD is only payable on the remaining 50.1%. 
However, ACD will be payable on the difference between the equity 
interests owned after the transaction and the lowest amount of equity 
                                                          
28 See s 23(6) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
29 See s 23(7) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
30 See s 23(9) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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interests owned at any time since 11 March 2017. Thus, the taxpayer will 
be taxed on the full 100% of the equity interests acquired if all the equity 
interests were acquired after 11 March 2017. 
16 In addition to this general position, artificially split transactions 
will be caught in the specified cases,31 since ACD is charged on 
prescribed arrangements32 that include, inter alia, any scheme and all 
steps by which it is carried into effect.33 Thus, the two transactions can 
be viewed as a single arrangement and ACD accordingly levied on the 
full 100% transfer of equity interests. 
17 In the case of some corporate transactions, a string of 
transactions may be mandated by the relevant rules and one must be 
aware that just because a transaction is split, it does not mean that no 
ACD is payable on the transactions that took place before the owner 
became a significant owner. For example, a party may be forced to make 
a mandatory offer on obtaining de facto control of a company,34 or on 
triggering the creeper rule.35 Alternatively, there might be issues of 
compulsory acquisition if a party successfully acquires 90% or more of 
outstanding shares in a company.36 
D. Determining applicability of additional conveyance duties in 
practice 
18 To determine whether ACD is applicable, there are two 
potentially extensive checks that must be done. First, one must 
determine if there is a significant owner of the entity in question. 
Second, one must determine whether the said entity is a PHE. While 
these two checks may not seem conceptually difficult, the actual process 
                                                          
31 See para 46, at n 64 below. 
32 See s 23C(1) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
33 See s 23C(11) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
34 See r 14.1(a) of Securities Industry Council, The Singapore Code on Take-Overs and 
Mergers (25 March 2016): where “any person acquires whether by a series of 
transactions over a period of time or not, shares which (taken together with shares 
held or acquired by persons acting in concert with him) carry 30% or more of the 
voting rights of a company”. 
35 See r 14.1(b) of Securities Industry Council, The Singapore Code on Take-Overs and 
Mergers (25 March 2016): where “any person who, together with persons acting in 
concert with him, holds not less than 30% but not more than 50% of the voting 
rights and such person, or any person acting in concert with him, acquires in any 
period of 6 months additional shares carrying more than 1% of the voting rights”. 
36 See ss 215(1) and 215(3) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed). 
Section 215(1) provides that in such a case, the acquiring party may compulsorily 
acquire the shares of the dissenting shareholders. Section 215(3) provides that in 
such a case, the dissenting shareholders may require the acquiring party to acquire 
their shares on the same terms as those applicable to the approving shareholders. 
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of conducting them may be quite complex. This Part will consider some 
implications and difficulties inherent in the following conditions. 
(1) Significant owner 
19 The condition of “significant ownership” means that ACD will 
only potentially be payable where there is a shareholder holding 50% or 
more of the shares in an entity.37 Thus, ACD is less likely to be applicable 
where shareholdings in a company are fragmented (for instance, where a 
public company is involved). The difficulty in determining whether the 
“significant ownership” condition has been met arises from two issues. 
First, the percentage of share ownership is determined with reference to 
both direct and indirect ownership. Second, the holdings of “associates” 
have to be taken into account when determining the percentage of share 
ownership. 
(a) Associates 
20 Spouses, parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren and 
siblings of the taxpayer are deemed to be associates;38 and parties with 
whom the taxpayer has an arrangement (express or implied) with 
respect to the equity interests or voting rights in the entity being 
conveyed are also associates.39 Further, entities which a party owns to a 
significant extent are also considered as associates. “Significant extent” is 
defined as: at least 75% of the voting capital of a company and at least 
50% of the voting power of a company; or a unit in a property trust.40 
There are three ways in which an entity may hold the voting capital and 
voting power in another entity – (a) directly, (b) through a single chain 
or (c) through multiple chains.41 
21 In practice, the test for the existence of an “associate 
relationship” may involve extensive due diligence into the structure of a 
business group, its relevant contracts and the family members of key 
shareholders. The fact that voting capital and voting power can be held 
directly and indirectly further necessitates a closer examination into the 
holdings of the business group. 
                                                          
37 The 50% figure is prescribed by s 23(11) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed), referring to paras 4(1) and 4(2) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) 
Order 2017 (“section 23 Order”). Currently, the values prescribed under paras 4(1) 
and 4(2) of the section 23 Order are both “50% or more”. This may be subject to 
change. 
38 See s 23(20)(a) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
39 See s 23(20)(c) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
40 See para 6(8) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
41 See para 6(2) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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(2) Property-holding entity 
22 If there is no significant owner in a transaction, it is clear that 
ACD will not be payable (barring the invocation of any anti-avoidance 
rules). However, if the first check results in the identification of a 
significant owner, the next issue then becomes whether the entity in 
question is a PHE. Besides direct holdings, this determination needs to 
take into account all the indirect holdings of the entity whenever they 
are held by a subsidiary which the entity owns 50% or more of 
(a significant stake). The key question is whether the value of all 
residential properties directly and indirectly owned by the entity in 
question amounts to 50% or more of the value of all the assets owned by 
the entity and its subsidiaries (“the property-heavy condition”). If so, the 
entity in question is a PHE. 
23 In practice, this would once again involve extensive due 
diligence. Valuations for all the residential properties held directly or 
indirectly by the entity would need to be examined. The entity and its 
subsidiaries would have to be valued as well. The computation is made 
more complex due to the fact that the residential properties held by 
associates will also have to be taken into account when determining if 
one has a significant stake in an entity. Thus, the entire process of 
calculating valuations would involve an assessment of the structure of 
the business group, relevant contracts and the holdings of family 
members of the key shareholders. 
24 While the two checks can potentially be done rather swiftly 
where a business group has a lean and uncomplicated structure, the 
difficulty increases exponentially the more entities there are in the 
group and the more contracts the group enters into. Realistically, as part 
of most corporate transactions, a due diligence report will be required. 
The possibility that ACD may be payable may necessitate the production 
of a legal opinion on the issue, even if merely to produce a nil-return. 
Given the potential complexity of the two checks, this legal opinion may 
require considerable work and costs to produce. 
II. Additional conveyance duties liability for corporate 
transactions 
A. Gatekeeper provision 
25 The starting point in analysing ACD in corporate transactions is 
the “gatekeeper provision” in s 23(21)(a) of the SDA, which limits the 
scope of the ACD regime to cases where there is a conveyance of an 
“equity interest”. The SDA defines “equity interest” as “where the entity is 
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a company, an issued share in the company that is not a treasury share”. 
It follows that conveyances of non-shares are not chargeable with ACD. 
(1) “Treasury shares” 
26 While “treasury shares” are not defined in the SDA, the 
Companies Act42 defines a “treasury share” as a share which “was (or is 
treated as having been) purchased by a company in circumstances in 
which section 76H [of the Companies Act] applies; and … has been held 
by the company continuously since the treasury share was so 
purchased”.43 In other words, treasury shares are those shares which have 
been acquired by a company in a share buyback. 
B. Nature of a “share” 
27 In defining “equity interest”, the draftsman curiously chose to 
base the concept on “issued shares”. This has interesting implications, 
given that, as will be argued,44 the core focus of the ACD regime appears 
to be centred on the (indirect) ownership and control of residential 
properties. Following from this assumption, the ACD regime should 
apply only to those instruments which grant rights of ownership and 
control of a PHE to their holders, viz, equity, not debt, instruments. The 
exclusion of debt instruments is supported by the use of the term “equity 
interests”. However, the exclusivity of the ACD regime is undermined by 
a reference to “issued shares”, which may arguably include debt 
instruments like preference and redeemable shares. 
28 Other legislation does not shed light on the definition of “share”. 
The SDA does not define “share” in the context of companies. The 
Companies Act defines “share” in a decidedly vague and unhelpful 
manner as a “share in the share capital of a corporation and includes 
stock except where a distinction between stocks and shares is expressed 
or implied”.45 The ambiguity in the definition of “share” raises serious 
concerns. First, a literal reading of the SDA would mean that debt 
instruments such as preference and redeemable shares would count as 
“equity interests” and would be caught by the ACD regime. Second, and 
more seriously, if “share” is not defined in any meaningful way, might a 
taxpayer be able to sidestep the ACD regime by tweaking the 
nomenclature of the instrument in question such that it is not labelled as 
a share?46 Conceptually, it is unsatisfying that the paramount concept of 
                                                          
42 Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed. 
43 Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 4(1). 
44 See para 32, at n 51 below. 
45 See para 32, at n 51 below. 
46 This point is addressed in detail in para 36, at n 52 below. 
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“equity interest” should be defined as “an issued share” when there is no 
clear statutory or common law prescription as to the use of the 
term “share”. 
C. Parliamentary intention as to nature of a “share” 
29 It is trite law that in Singapore, the courts are to apply a 
purposive interpretation in the construction of statutes.47 This involves 
discerning parliamentary intention and interpreting the SDA to give 
effect to that intention. However, purposive interpretation of the SDA 
can be difficult. First, the ACD regime was introduced by way of an 
urgent bill. As there was no debate over the Bill in Parliament, Hansard 
provides us with no guidance as to Parliament’s intentions. Second, the 
Explanatory Statement to the Amendment Bill states that its purpose is 
“primarily to introduce new ad valorem duties for conveyances of equity 
interests in property-holding entities (PHE) that are computed on the 
basis of their underlying immovable properties”.48 However, this 
statement merely begs the question of what an “equity interest” is. 
However, we may draw assistance from two other sources: (a) the SDA 
as a whole; and (b) the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) 
e-Tax Guide.49 
(1) Interpreting Stamp Duties Act as a whole 
30 It is an established principle that an act or other instrument 
must be read as a whole.50 In s 23(21)(b) of the SDA, “equity interest” is 
defined, “where the entity is a partnership, limited partnership or 
limited liability partnership, [as] a share in the partnership”. In turn, 
“share” is defined in the same subsection as this: 
[In] relation to a partnership, limited partnership or limited liability 
partnership … 
(a) the proportion of the partnership property that a 
partner is entitled to on the dissolution or winding up of the 
partnership, as specified in the partnership agreement; or 
                                                          
47 See s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed), applied in Public 
Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183, ABU v Comptroller of Income Tax 
[2015] SLR 420 and Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng [2017] 1 SLR 373. 
48 Stamp Duties (Amendment) Bill (Bill 18 of 2017), Explanatory Statement. 
49 Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Stamp Duty: 
Additional Conveyance Duties (ACD) on Residential Property-Holding Entities 
(Second Edition) (19 February 2018). 
50 See Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (Oliver Jones ed) (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 
2013) at s 355, citing Customs and Excise v Zielinski Baker & Partners Ltd [2004] 
1 WLR 707; [2004] 2 All ER 141; [2004] UKHL 7 and Effort Shipping Co Ltd v 
Linden Management SA, The Giannis NK [1998] AC 605; [1998] 1 All ER 495. 
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(b) if none is specified, the proportion of the profits of 
the partnership that a partner is entitled [to.] 
31 It is submitted that this evidences that the draftsman intended 
“equity interests” of a company to refer to those rights of ownership and 
control conferred by equity instruments, conventionally understood. 
The rights available to holders of an equity interest in the case of a 
partnership are in line with the rights of shareholders in a company and 
not debenture holders. Accordingly, an “issued share” in the gatekeeper 
provision should be interpreted to mean an equity instrument issued by 
the entity in question. 
(2) Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore e-Tax Guide 
32 IRAS has expressed its view that: “[the] purpose is to address 
the stamp duty rate differential between direct acquisition/disposal of 
residential properties and indirect acquisition/disposal of residential 
properties via an entity”.51 It is worth noting that as a matter of legislative 
procedure, IRAS would have been consulted on the proposed bill and 
would arguably have a good understanding of the aims driving the 
amendments. 
33 IRAS’s view is telling in that it establishes clearly that the focus 
of the ACD regime is to catch indirect “acquisitions/disposals” of 
residential property. It is submitted here that the key focus of the ACD 
regime is on the transfers of ownership, and to a lesser extent, control of 
residential properties. While transfers of equity instruments issued by 
entity would give a holder some degree of control over residential 
property, the transfer of a debt instrument gives a creditor no such 
control. To impose ACD where a debt instrument is conveyed would 
thus be completely beyond the contemplation of Parliament when they 
enacted the amendments. A creditor cannot be said to have acquired 
residential property in any way, directly or indirectly. 
(3) “Over-inclusive” and “under-inclusive” 
34 If we adopt a purposive interpretation of the SDA and attempt 
to give effect to the intention of Parliament, it is arguable that a literal 
reading of the gatekeeper provision that defines shares as equity 
interests may be both over and under-inclusive. It arguably catches more 
than it was intended to, in that debentures such as preference shares are 
potentially caught by the ACD regime. On the other hand, other forms 
                                                          
51 Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Stamp Duty: 
Additional Conveyance Duties (ACD) on Residential Property-Holding Entities 
(Second Edition) (19 February 2018) at para 2.1. 
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of non-share equity instruments may not be caught even though they 
potentially transfer ownership and control over residential properties. 
D. Re-labelling instruments 
35 If the gatekeeper provision levies ACD only in cases where there 
is a conveyance of “issued shares” and there is no conclusive definition 
of a “share”, there is decidedly a temptation on the part of the taxpayer to 
attempt to label an equity instrument as something other than a share. 
(1) Possible responses by tax authority 
36 In such a case, IRAS may well decide to invoke the specific anti-
avoidance rules (“SAAR”) in s 23C of the SDA. Under s 23C(1) of the 
SDA, where one of the prescribed arrangements52 has the effect of a 
person’s (“X’s”) increase in equity interests in an entity and the 
conveyance would have been chargeable with ACD or stamp duties if it 
had been conveyed to X; the arrangement is treated as a conveyance of 
equity interests to X. The Commissioner is empowered to charge ACD 
and/or stamp duties on an instrument evidencing such a transfer or on a 
notice prescribed in the section 23 Order.53 The same applies if one of 
the prescribed arrangements has the effect of a person’s decrease in 
equity interests in an entity.54 However, this SAAR may fail to catch even 
the most blatant avoidance schemes because it begs the question of what 
“equity interests” are. If the instrument in question is not an “equity 
interest”, it follows that s 23C(1) cannot apply to levy ACD on its 
issuance, transfer or cancellation. 
37 Alternatively, IRAS may choose to invoke another SAAR in the 
form of s 23C(10) of the SDA. This subsection has more teeth, for it 
provides that the section 23 Order may prescribe certain arrangements 
as “equivalent arrangements” if their purpose or effect is to (directly or 
indirectly) alter the incidence or quantum of duty under the ACD 
regime. For instruments which the Commissioner thinks effect or are 
evidence of an equivalent arrangement, the ACD regime will similarly 
apply.55 The section 23 Order has not made any such prescription for 
now. The SDA expressly provides that the Commissioner may still 
exercise his anti-avoidance powers on an arrangement even if it “is 
carried out for a bona fide commercial reason”.56 This SAAR sidesteps 
                                                          
52 See s 23C(3) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), addressed in detail 
in para 50–62, at nn 66–75 below. 
53 Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
54 See s 23C(2) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
55 See s 23C(9) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
56 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) s 23C(11). 
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the issue of the definition of “equity interest”, for regardless of whether 
“equity interest” extends to equity instruments, the Commissioner may 
still levy ACD on the issuance, transfer or cancellation of equity 
instruments if he invokes the section 23 Order. 
38 Thus, if the understanding of the parliamentary intention 
behind the enactment of the ACD regime as expressed in this article is 
correct, IRAS already possesses an adequate legislative framework to 
give effect to parliamentary intention. It can choose to grant an 
administrative concession and forgo levying ACD on conveyances 
involving preference shares and other “shares” of a debt nature. It can 
also invoke the section 23 Order to impose ACD on the issuance, 
transfer or cancellation of equity instruments, even if they are 
not shares. 
(2) Possible response of courts 
39 Fundamentally, however, there is something deeply unsatisfying 
about the tax authority having to rely on an administrative concession 
and a SAAR to carry out what was arguably Parliament’s intention in the 
first place. A more attractive solution would be for the courts to 
judicially clarify the scope of the SDA by applying a purposive 
interpretation to give effect to Parliament’s intention in defining “equity 
interest”. While “equity interest” is defined in the SDA as being an issued 
share that is not a treasury share, it is noted that nowhere in the SDA is 
the term “share” defined in the context of companies. As referenced 
above, even the definition of “share” in the Companies Act is not 
particularly instructive on this point. This provides the courts with the 
opportunity to interpret “share” as an equity instrument granting rights 
of ownership and control of a PHE. The problem here is that the courts 
will not get to rule on this point until the issue is litigated, and the 
intervening uncertainty for both IRAS and the taxpayer would not be 
ideal. Parliament may well wish to make its intentions clear by 
amending the SDA to remove all doubt. 
III. Implications of broad definition of a “share” 
40 If, however, the above mechanisms do not work to limit “issued 
shares” to equity instruments, and “issued share” adopts the broader 
definition that encompasses debt instruments, like preference shares and 
redeemable shares, there may be the following implications. 
A. Equity capital markets 
41 The limited definition of a treasury share, coupled with the 
exceedingly vague definition of “share” in s 4 of the Companies Act 
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effectively means that almost any kind of issued share (of a PHE) is 
capable of falling within the ACD regime and potentially catches the 
entirety of instruments that can be issued in equity capital markets 
practice. 
B. Debt capital markets 
42 In the pre-2014 Companies Act,57 a preference share was 
defined as a share which does not entitle the holder thereof to vote at a 
general meeting or to participate beyond a specified amount in any 
distribution, whether by way of dividend, or on redemption, in a 
winding-up, or otherwise. This has since been removed in the 2014 
amendments and not replaced. There is no equivalent definition in 
English or Australian law and with the removal of the definition of 
“preference share” in the Companies Act, it appears that the term is no 
longer a legal term of art.58 This in itself is problematic, for a preference 
share would appear to be caught by the ACD regime, yet no one seems 
to be able to definitely say what it is, and importantly, whether it is a 
form of debt or equity financing. Nevertheless, the traditional 
understanding of a preference share is that it is a debenture rather than a 
share.59 If the interpretation of parliamentary intention proposed in this 
article is correct, it would have been completely beyond the 
contemplation of Parliament to impose ACD on the issuance, transfer or 
cancellation of preference shares. 
C. Hybrids and convertibles 
43 In practice, the multitude of financial instrument available 
means that it is often difficult to definitively say whether an instrument 
is equity or debt in nature. This is particularly a problem if the 
gatekeeper provision is read literally, for then whether ACD is imposed 
would have nothing to do with the true nature of the instrument in 
question, but merely whether it is labelled as a share. In light of IRAS’s 
expressed views in its e-Tax Guide,60 it is likely to seek to levy ACD on 
transactions involving equity instruments, regardless of their 
nomenclature. 
                                                          
57 That is, Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed). 
58 Although, oddly, s 70 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) does provide 
for the power to issue redeemable preference shares which are “liable to be 
redeemed” by the company, no definition of “preference share” is provided. 
59 See Inland Revenue Commissioners v Pullman Car Co Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1029. 
60 This is as discussed in para 32, at n 51 above. 
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(1) Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore e-Tax Guide 
44 IRAS’s approach to the decision on whether an instrument has 
“equity interests” will in all probability be heavily influenced by their 
existing e-Tax Guide on the income tax treatment of hybrid 
instruments.61 It is thus useful to understand the framework laid out by 
IRAS, even though the courts are likely to refer to the common law 
instead should the issue be litigated. 
45 The starting point for IRAS is to characterise the instrument in 
question based on its legal form, examining the legal rights and 
obligations created by the instrument. For IRAS, an instrument is likely 
to be characterised as equity if its legal terms indicate ownership 
interests.62 However, if the legal form of a hybrid instrument is not 
indicative or does not reflect the legal obligations and rights, IRAS will 
consider the following non-exhaustive factors: (a) nature of the interest 
acquired (shareholding and residual interest); (b) right to participate in 
the issuer’s business; (c) voting rights; (d) obligation to repay the 
principal amount; (e) payout (periodic and/or cumulative distribution); 
(f) investor’s right to enforce payment; (g) classification by other 
regulatory authority; and (h) ranking for repayment in the event of 
liquidation or dissolution.63 Broadly speaking, this is a good framework 
for assessing whether an instrument is debt or equity in nature. It is 
noted that IRAS is already adept at applying this classification, since it is 
currently used to determine the income tax treatment of financial 
instruments. It would not take too much effort to use this framework to 
determine the applicability of the ACD regime to various financial 
instruments. 
D. Specified cases 
46 ACD is levied on the conveyance, transfer, or assignment of 
equity interests or a contract or agreement for the sale of equity 
interests.64 On a plain reading of the SDA, all three terms seem to 
suggest that ACD may be limited to a transfer of equity interests, 
potentially omitting situations where equity interests are issued or 
cancelled. The present author will call this the “general case” where ACD 
may be levied. In addition to the general case, s 23C(3) of the SDA lists 
                                                          
61 Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Income Tax 
Treatment of Hybrid Instruments (19 May 2014). 
62 Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Income Tax 
Treatment of Hybrid Instruments (19 May 2014) at para 5.2. 
63 Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Income Tax 
Treatment of Hybrid Instruments (19 May 2014) at paras 5.2 and 5.3. 
64 See ss 23(1), 23B(1) and 23B(2) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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some other arrangements where ACD may be levied. These 
arrangements caught by s 23C(3) go beyond a mere transfer of equity 
interests and include issuance and cancellation as well. The author will 
call them the “specified cases”. 
47 The first issue is whether there is a difference in the way ACD is 
levied under the general and specified cases. Under the general case, the 
taxpayer has the responsibility for determining if ACD is payable and 
ensuring that the relevant instruments are duly stamped. This is a little 
more complicated under the specified cases, for s 23C(2) uses the 
following language: 
[ACD is] chargeable on the following instrument as if it were such a 
conveyance: 
(a) any instrument that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, 
effects (whether directly or indirectly and whether wholly or 
partially) or is evidence of the arrangement; or 
(b) in the absence of any such instrument, a notice 
prescribed in the section 23 Order for the purposes of this 
paragraph. 
[emphasis added] 
The reference to the Commissioner’s opinion naturally raises questions 
as to when the liability to pay ACD arises and whether there is a duty to 
seek the Commissioner’s opinion. A few points are worth noting here. 
First, since the Commissioner’s opinion is required, it may be argued 
that no liability to pay ACD arises in the absence of such an opinion. 
Second, there does not seem to be an express requirement to seek the 
Commissioner’s opinion before going ahead with the conveyance. These 
factors lead one to wonder whether this provision would essentially only 
be invoked in a tax audit, after the Commissioner has raised questions 
about the conveyance. 
48 In many cases where s 23C of the SDA may be invoked, 
however, it is simply impractical to adopt a wait-and-see attitude with 
respect to whether the Commissioner will examine the transaction and 
decide that ACD is payable. The tax impact of the transaction is likely to 
have to be disclosed in many cases, for example, where there is a 
primary or secondary offering, or scheme of arrangement. Thus, even at 
the risk of “tipping off ” the Commissioner, it is likely that his opinion 
will have to be sought. 
49 It is further worth noting that s 23C(2)(b) of the SDA effects a 
major departure from the core principles of stamp duties. Stamp duties 
is a tax levied on instruments and not transactions. It follows that a 
transaction must have an instrument capable of being stamped if ACD is 
to be imposed. However, s 23C(2)(b) provides that the section 23 Order 
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may require a person to give a notice relating to a prescribed 
arrangement in a specified form to the Commissioner. The 
Commissioner may then treat the notice as an instrument and levy 
stamp duty on it.65 Technically, this preserves the nature of stamp duty 
as a tax on instruments, though it might be said to be quite a 
technicality since it involves requiring a taxpayer to create an 
instrument solely for the purpose of levying stamp duty on it. 
(1) Acquisition by entity of its equity interests66 
50 Essentially, share buybacks are potentially subject to the ACD 
regime. It is worth noting that it is not the entity in question that pays 
the ACD but the majority shareholders (holding 50% or more of the 
shares in the entity in question). As the current definition of a 
significant owner is one who owns 50% or more of the shares in an 
entity, there can at most be an absolute maximum of four significant 
owners at any given point of time (two owners owning 50% equity each 
and two owners holding 50% voting power each). In practice, there is 
almost always going to be only one significant owner (if any). Taxing the 
majority shareholder and not the entity also results in the rather rare 
situation where tax liability may be imposed on a non-party to a 
transaction. Of course, realistically, majority shareholders will almost 
always have a say (if not determine) in whether the transaction is to 
proceed or not. 
51 Liability to pay ACD on the part of majority shareholders may 
arise in two distinct ways. First, duty A or C may be payable if a majority 
shareholder ends up increasing his percentage of equity interests as a 
result of the share buyback. This may occur if the repurchased shares are 
immediately cancelled, resulting in a smaller overall pool of shares. 
Second, duty B or D may be payable if shares are directly repurchased 
from a majority shareholder. Since it is possible for multiple types of 
ACD duties to be paid on a single transaction, it is not impossible for a 
majority shareholder to end up having to pay some combination of the 
four duties on a single share buyback. This would occur when the 
majority shareholder participated in a share buyback exercise, but did 
not sell many shares. He would then have transferred equity interests 
but still end up with a higher percentage of equity interests than before 
the share buyback. 
                                                          
65 See s 23C(12) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), referencing para 7 
of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
66 See s 23C(3)(a) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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(2) Issue by entity of equity interests67 
52 This provision covers both primary and secondary offerings of 
shares. The situation here is the inverse of that immediately considered 
above. Liability to pay ACD on the part of majority shareholders may 
arise in two distinct ways. Duty B or D may be payable if the majority 
shareholder ends up decreasing his percentage of equity interests due to 
the dilutive effect of the issuance of new shares. Duty A or C may also be 
payable if the majority shareholder has directly subscribed to the new 
shares. Once again, it is possible for a majority shareholder to end up 
having to pay some combination of the four duties on a single 
share issue. 
53 On a plain reading of this section, it would appear that it is so 
broadly drafted that it seems that even where a sole shareholder injects 
money into his company and receives shares, that transaction may be 
caught under the ACD regime. Similarly, it would appear that in the case 
of a joint venture, if the partners make pro rata contributions of capital 
to the company, ACD will also have to be payable. However, IRAS has 
since made a very welcome clarification in its latest e-Tax Guide that “an 
issuance of equity interest for capitalisation purposes is not subject to 
ACD if there are no changes in the persons holding the equity interests 
and the respective holdings of equity interest, before and after the 
issuance”.68 
(3) Cancellation or redemption of equity interests in entity69 
54 There is a conceptual distinction between a share buyback and a 
share cancellation. Shares may be repurchased but not cancelled 
(becoming treasury shares) and shares may be cancelled without being 
repurchased. It is possible that the draftsman intended to make it clear 
that the cancellation of shares may be a taxable event, bearing in mind 
that a popular way to avoid the payment of stamp duty on the transfer of 
shares is to directly cancel them, since cancellation of shares does not 
need to be effected by an instrument. Interestingly enough, there is no 
overlap between ss 23C(3)(a) and 23C(3)(c) of the SDA. Once a share is 
acquired, it becomes a treasury share and thus, by definition, not an 
equity interest. Thus, its cancellation will not attract ACD. 
                                                          
67 See s 23C(3)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
68 Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Stamp Duty: 
Additional Conveyance Duties (ACD) on Residential Property-Holding Entities 
(Second Edition) (19 February 2018) at para 6.2. 
69 See s 23C(3)(c) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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(4) Conversion of instruments70 
(a) Converting equity interests into instruments that are not equity 
interests 
55 This type of transaction is akin to a simultaneous share buyback 
and issuance of debentures. As such, one would expect a majority 
shareholder to be affected in the same way as in a share buyback. Duty A 
or C may be payable if a majority shareholder ends up increasing his 
percentage of equity interests as a result of the conversion. Again, duty B 
or D may also be payable. 
(b) Converting instruments that are not equity interests into equity 
interests 
56 It is fairly common for entities to issue debt instruments that 
can be converted into shares (such as convertible bonds). Such a 
conversion is akin to a simultaneous share issuance and redemption of 
debentures. One would accordingly expect a majority shareholder to be 
affected in the same way as in a share issuance. Duty B or D may be 
payable if the majority shareholder ends up decreasing his percentage of 
equity interests due to the dilutive effect of the issuance of new shares. 
As above, Duty A or C may also be payable. 
(c) Converting equity interests from one class to another class 
57 This provision may have the effect of a share issuance or share 
buyback depending on the change in equity interests resulting from the 
class conversion. 
(5) Conversion of entity to another type of entity71 
58 There may be some confusion with regards to this provision 
because of the term “entity”. While in the ACD regime, “entity” includes 
those business structures without separate legal personality, such as 
trusts, general partnerships and limited partnerships, it would appear 
that when we refer to the conversion of entities, we must necessarily be 
talking about the conversion from one entity to another, both entities of 
which have separate legal personality. It is not possible to assert, for 
instance, that a general partnership has “converted” into a company. As 
far as the law is concerned, that is not a “conversion” but a transfer of 
assets from a group of individuals to another legal person (the 
company). 
                                                          
70 See s 23C(3)(d) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
71 See s 23C(3)(e) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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59 Special cases aside, as far as Singapore business structures are 
concerned, there are only two main types of possible conversions: that of 
a limited liability partnership (“LLP”) converting into a company or vice 
versa. A problem of potential double taxation arises when an LLP 
converts into a company. This arises from the existence of s 32A of the 
SDA and will be covered in the next Part. 
(6) Change of partners of partnership, limited partnership or limited 
liability partnership72 
60 While partnerships are not covered in detail in this article, the 
application of s 32A of the SDA may have some relevance to the 
corporate practitioner. Section 32A is a SAAR that seeks to catch 
instances of partners avoiding the payment of stamp duty by 
transferring their interests in the LLP instead of the immovable property 
itself. This provision treats an instrument effecting or evidencing a 
significant change in partners as a conveyance of immovable property, 
on which stamp duties are payable. It is noted that s 32A is probably a 
relic of the past that was not repealed when the ACD regime was 
introduced to prevent precisely that kind of tax avoidance that s 32A 
sought to prevent. If the general case of ACD potentially applies to 
transfers of equity interest in an LLP, these transfers may be subjected to 
the ridiculous theoretical possibility of triple taxation under s 23C(3)(f), 
the general case of ACD and s 32A. 
(7) Amalgamation of entities73 
61 Effectively, an amalgamation of entities involves one or more of 
the following transactions for each of the various entities: share 
issuances or buybacks; and debentures issuances or redemptions. Thus, 
depending on the change in equity interests, the same consequences 
considered earlier may apply to the majority shareholder. It is worth 
recalling that, where ACD is potentially dutiable, the stamp duty relief 
provisions are not applicable to the transaction.74 Practitioners hoping to 
rely on stamp duty relief should take note. 
(8) Any other arrangement75 
62 The list of specified cases is not exhaustive, as it potentially 
includes any other arrangement that “in the Commissioner’s opinion, 
                                                          
72 See s 23C(3)(f) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
73 See s 23C(3)(g) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
74 See ss 15(1AA) and 15A(1A) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
75 See s 23C(3)(h) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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has as its purpose or one of its purposes” the effect of changing the 
holding of equity interests. 
IV. Additional conveyance duties in corporate practice 
63 This section focuses on the common transactions encountered 
in corporate practice and considers the relevant ACD implications. 
Apart from the broad situations covered earlier, several popular 
corporate strategies may attract ACD liability. 
A. Concepts determining relevant relationships: Parties acting in 
concert versus associates 
64 Reading the Takeovers Code76 together with the SDA can be a 
rather confusing affair. Both the Takeovers Code and SDA appreciate 
that the relevant authorities should look beyond the holdings of an 
individual to determine if there are any other parties working so closely 
with that individual, such that their holdings should be taken into 
consideration together with the individual’s for the purposes of 
enforcing the relevant rules. The Takeovers Code has no less than three 
concepts designed to address this: (a) parties acting in concert;77 
(b) associates;78 and (c) associated companies.79 On the other hand, the 
SDA applies a single concept of “associate”, an extensive umbrella term 
that may potentially be quite tricky to apply in practice.80 As the 
concepts determining relevant relationships in the Takeovers Code and 
SDA are very different, there is no reason to assume that the total 
shareholdings computed under the Takeovers Code and SDA will be the 
same or even anywhere within range of each other. It is particularly 
dangerous to assume that just because a crucial threshold under the 
Takeovers Code has not been crossed (for example, the 30%-mandatory-
offer threshold) another threshold under the SDA would similarly not 
have been crossed (for example, the 50%-or-more-significant-owner 
threshold). 
65 The concept of an associate in the SDA glaringly omits a key 
issue. While the SDA provides that parties with whom the taxpayer has 
                                                          
76 Securities Industry Council, The Singapore Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 
(25 March 2016). 
77 See Securities Industry Council, The Singapore Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 
(25 March 2016) at pp 5–9. 
78 See Securities Industry Council, The Singapore Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 
(25 March 2016) at pp 9–10. 
79 See Securities Industry Council, The Singapore Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 
(25 March 2016) at p 11. 
80 See para 20, at nn 38–41 above. 
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an arrangement (express or implied) with respect to the equity interests 
or voting rights in the entity being conveyed are associates,81 it provides 
no guidance as to what the test for an “arrangement” is. Perhaps some 
guidance can be drawn from the experience of the UK’s Takeover Panel 
in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Wan Wai Yee and 
Umakanth Varottil have argued that in the context of the Takeovers 
Code, “the need for an agreement or understanding for cooperation 
suggests that there must be a commonality or community of interests 
between a person and those acting in concert”.82 They go on to interpret 
the UK’s Takeover Panel as finding that “what matters is the intention to 
support or assist in acquiring control over the target with the knowledge 
of doing so”.83 This position should be adopted in view of the need for a 
test for the existence of an arrangement with respect to the relevant 
equity interest or voting rights. Such a test has to be carefully crafted, 
with clear limits. Otherwise, it might be possible to argue that any 
agreement between shareholders to vote for a particular resolution to 
issue, transfer or cancel equity interests might be a relevant 
arrangement. The shareholders held to be “acting in concert” would 
then almost always collectively reach the 50% or more significant owner 
threshold and have to pay any ACD resulting from the resolution. 
66 In their analysis of two seminal UK cases,84 Wan and Umakanth 
concluded that “the mere presence of a commercial relationship in the 
ordinary course may be insufficient to constitute a concert party 
relationship. However, if there are unusual relationships that are 
extraordinary in nature, that might point towards the existence of 
concert party relationship if the surrounding circumstances support 
such a finding”.85 Thus, in the absence of a finding of an express 
arrangement with respect to the relevant equity interest or voting rights, 
it might be difficult (but still possible) to find an implied arrangement. 
B. Strategies 
(1) Transfers of assets 
67 Under the ACD regime, the entity which equity interests are 
being conveyed must be a PHE (and thus, property-heavy) at the point 
                                                          
81 See s 23(20)(c) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
82 Wan Wai Yee & Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law 
and Practice (LexisNexis, 2013) at p 419. 
83 Wan Wai Yee & Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law 
and Practice (LexisNexis, 2013) at p 420. 
84 R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 (CA); 
R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146 (CA). 
85 Wan Wai Yee & Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law 
and Practice (LexisNexis, 2013) at p 422. 
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of the conveyance. This naturally creates a temptation to engage in 
transactions that would cause the entity to fail to satisfy the property-
heavy condition. The two most obvious methods would include either 
selling some residential properties owned by the entity in question or 
flooding the entity with other assets to dilute the proportion of value of 
the entity made up by residential properties. This can be a temporary or 
permanent arrangement, noting that technically, one could buy the 
properties back or remove the other assets the next day potentially 
without triggering ACD. 
68 The draftsman of the SDA has wisely foreseen this scheme and 
provided in s 23C(6) and 23C(7) for a SAAR that would catch it. If an 
arrangement which results in the change in the composition of the 
tangible assets of an entity (or any other arrangement that the 
Commissioner thinks has avoidance as its purpose) results in an entity 
ceasing to be a PHE within a prescribed period before the transfer of 
equity interests within it, ACD may be levied notwithstanding that the 
entity in question may not be a PHE.86 The Commissioner has the 
power to provide for this prescribed period under the section 23 Order, 
but it is noted that this power has not yet been exercised at the moment. 
(2) Revaluation 
69 An entity may seek to have its assets revalued if it estimates that 
it would not be a PHE under the new valuation. However, the ACD 
regime does not allow entities to freely revise their valuation of assets for 
the purposes of determining whether they are PHEs. The SDA 
prescribes that the market values used in the relevant formula must be 
those “as at the end of the most recent completed accounting period” of 
the relevant PHEs.87 This has the effect of “locking in” the market values 
of assets for a length of time, regardless of the degree of fluctuations of 
market values that might have taken place in the meantime. While it is 
understood that there has to be some kind of anti-avoidance rule in this 
area to prevent revaluations of which the primary purpose is to obtain a 
tax benefit, to lock in the market values for a period that may span three 
months to a year may not be fair to the taxpayer. This is particularly so 
when we consider that the residential property market can completely 
change in a very short period. Perhaps Parliament considers allowing 
entities to freely conduct asset revaluations, but put a SAAR in place to 
prevent abuse of this. 
70 A new SAAR is required for it is argued that a revaluation of 
assets would not potentially fall under the current SAAR in ss 23C(6) 
                                                          
86 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) ss 23C(6) and 23C(7). 
87 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) ss 23(14) and 23(15). 
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and 23C(7) of the SDA since the said sections only catch “arrangements”. 
Under s 23C(11) of the SDA, an “arrangement” is defined as “any 
scheme, trust, grant, covenant, agreement, disposition or transaction”. In 
this context, it is hard to see how a revaluation in itself could constitute 
an arrangement. 
71 Even if Parliament makes this amendment, practitioners who 
wish to rely on an asset revaluation should be aware of the existence of a 
parallel timeline provided for in the Takeovers Code. Generally, the 
Securities Industry Council (“SIC”) will not permit a target company to 
announce material information such as asset valuations after the 
39th day following the posting of the offer document. This is to give 
potential bidders time to determine whether to revise its offer in 
response to the new information.88 This rule may impact when the 
target entity may wish to carry out its asset revaluation. 
72 Further, r 26 of the Takeovers Code draws an important 
distinction between valuations of assets that are made in connection 
with an offer and those which are not. Valuations made in connection 
with an offer are subject to more stringent requirements, such as the 
need for the valuation to be supported by the opinion of a named 
independent professional expert and the need for the directors to state 
the basis of the valuation to the shareholders.89 In any case, IRAS will, in 
all probability, require the target company to show objective proof of the 
market value of its assets at the time of the relevant conveyance. 
(3) Anticipatory defensive measures 
73 Popular anticipatory defensive measures against hostile 
takeovers include (a) interlocking or circular shareholdings, where two 
or more companies acquire and hold large but non-controlling blocks of 
shares in each other;90 (b) pyramiding, where a pyramidal structure of 
interlocking shareholdings are held through a series of inter-related 
companies under the same ultimate management control;91 and 
(c) shareholders voting agreements.92 Such defensive measures may 
become rather a lot more expensive to set up with the advent of the 
                                                          
88 Wan Wai Yee & Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law 
and Practice (LexisNexis, 2013) at p 534. 
89 Wan Wai Yee & Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law 
and Practice (LexisNexis, 2013) at pp 535–537. 
90 See Chidambaram Chandrasegar, Take-Overs and Mergers (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 
2010) at p 340. 
91 See Chidambaram Chandrasegar, Take-Overs and Mergers (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 
2010) at p 341. 
92 See Chidambaram Chandrasegar, Take-Overs and Mergers (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 
2010) at pp 342–343. 
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ACD regime. Due to a very broad concept of an “associate”, it is likely 
that where various companies or individuals under the same ultimate 
management control transfer equity interests to set up the structures, 
they are going to meet the “significant ownership” condition and have to 
pay ACD on such transfers. More generally, certain consolidation or 
restructuring arrangements may now attract stamp duty liability that 
may not fall within the scope of existing stamp duty relief provisions.93 
C. Ambiguity 
(1) At or about the same time 
74 In corporate transactions, one rarely deals with single contracts. 
Instead, a considerable number of parties are normally involved over 
what can be a rather lengthy period. In this context, s 23(12)(b) of the 
SDA provides a rather unwelcome ambiguity with regard to when 
separate transactions should be treated as part of the same conveyance, 
such that ACD is levied at each stage. It states: 
[In] determining whether a grantee becomes a significant owner of an 
entity upon the execution of a conveyance, equity interests beneficially 
owned by each of the grantee’s associates in the entity, including those 
conveyed, transferred, assigned or agreed to be sold to any of the 
grantee’s associates at or about the same time as the time of execution 
of the conveyance, are treated as beneficially owned by the grantee. 
[emphasis added] 
The problem is that “at or about the same time” is not defined anywhere 
in the SDA or the section 23 Order, giving rise to an ambiguity as to 
when transactions will be taken to be part of the same conveyance. It 
should be noted that the impact of this provision is limited to situations 
where associates are involved. As noted above,94 artificially splitting 
transactions may not result in any tax advantage, since ACD will be 
levied on the difference between the equity interests owned after the 
transaction and the lowest amount of equity interests owned at any time 
since 11 March 2017. However, the interpretation of “at or about the 
same time” can potentially determine the quantum of ACD an owner 
must pay, should his associate purchase further equity interests 
subsequently. 
75 For example, assume that parties A and B are associates who do 
not own any equity interests in company X. A purchases 50% of the 
equity interests in company X. Three months later, B purchases 10% of 
the equity interests in company X. Regardless of how “at or about the 
                                                          
93 See para 1, at nn 5 and 6 above. 
94 See para 16, at n 31 above. 
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same time” is interpreted, B will have to pay ACD on 60% of the equity 
interests in company X. However, the interpretation of the term will 
determine whether A has to pay ACD on 50% or 60% of the equity 
interests in company X. Apart from the issue of potential double 
taxation, the question arises whether three months is “at or about the 
same time”. 
V. Conclusion 
A. Far-reaching consequences 
76 The ACD regime is a complex one of which application spans 
multiple areas of law. The key focus seems to be that it seems to apply 
almost whenever securities are issued or traded in companies heavy in 
residential properties. The number of ways in which ACD can be 
relevant to a transaction means that there is an opportunity for an ACD 
specialist dealing with residential property companies; one who can 
understand the ACD implications over a whole range of transactions. 
This may have created an entirely new specialisation. Much like projects, 
oil and gas, aviation and other practice areas, residential property has 
now become a new practice area in itself. A practitioner in this area must 
be able to understand not just one or two areas of law like mergers and 
acquisitions or capital markets, but a considerable mix of areas of law. 
77 Apart from understanding the implications of the ACD regime 
and when it applies, practitioners have to optimise their client’s 
positions vis-à-vis the regime. Given that the draftsman has done an 
excellent job at pre-empting tax avoidance, the practitioner’s main 
value-add may come in three main forms. 
78 First, it may be beneficial to seek an advance ruling from IRAS 
on behalf of clients. As noted, in many corporate transactions, the actual 
quantum of tax paid may not in fact be as important as the certainty of 
whether any tax has to be paid in the first place. Given the considerable 
ambiguity in this frankly rather new area of law, it may also be prudent 
to obtain a binding ruling from IRAS on which one may safely rely on. 
79 Second, it may be possible to engage with the Ministry of 
Finance (“MOF”) to determine if it might be willing to exercise its 
discretion to offer stamp duty remission under s 74 of the SDA. If a 
practitioner can successfully convince MOF that Parliament never 
intended to subject cases such as the proposed transaction to ACD, 
MOF may well be willing to remit the duties payable regardless of the 
liability it is empowered to impose under the SDA. 
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80 Third, with the balance swinging in favour of debt rather than 
equity financing further, there may be a need for careful development of 
financial instruments that have more characteristics representative of 
debt rather than equity instruments. The effect of utilising an 
instrument that is debt rather than equity in nature has consequences 
that extend beyond that of the deductibility of financing costs. ACD is a 
rather hefty duty that can reach almost 31% of the value of the 
residential property transferred. Taxpayers have to be sure of the 
eventual classification of the instruments that are used and may well 
seek legal opinions to insure themselves against the risk of a mistaken 
classification. 
 
